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Recent Cases
CIVIL nOCEMUE-SERvICE OF NoTicE BY MAmr-E acr OF NoN-_EcEiPT
ON A JUDG MNT INMASING CHILD-SupPORT PAYA.NTs-Appellant ob-
tained a divorce from appellee in 1947 and was ordered to pay $25 per
month for the support of his two minor children whose custody was
awarded to appellee. In 1954, appellee, in the same court, filed a
motion to redocket the action and modify the judgment by increasing
the support allowance to $50 per month. Notice of date of entry of
this motion was mailed to the out-of-state father but was not received
by him. Appellee's motion was heard and sustained in February, 1954,
and a modified order was entered to this effect. In June, 1954, appel-
lant moved to vacate the modified order on the ground that it was
void because no notice of the hearing was ever received by him.
From a denial of his motion, he appealed. Held: (5-1) 1 affirmed. The
serving of the notice, under Kentucky civil rules, was sufficient and
complete upon mailing, and validity of the service was not affected
by appellant's failure to receive the notice. Benson v. Benson, 291 S.W.
2d 27 (Ky. 1956).
The three separate opinions in the case suggest comment as to: (1)
whether, under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, a modification of
a divorce judgment which increases the child-support allowance should
be valid when service of notice is made by mail and is not received by
the person concerned, and (2) if so, whether the policy behind the
rule should be reexamined.
An action for divorce is an equity proceeding, but the court acquires
jurisdiction over the parties in the same manner as in proceedings at
law. As in actions at law, the validity of the judgment is dependent in
part on the validity of service, and the same requirements for service
obtain.
It is a well-established principle of equity that when chancery once
acquires jurisdiction over a subject-matter, it will continue to exercise
that jurisdiction so long and so often as occasion requires, so that its
decree may be made effective and full and final relief in the premises
may be granted.2 In a divorce action in which children are involved,
full and final relief is never assured until such children attain their
I Majority opinion by Stewart, J., separate concurring opinion by Cammack,
J.; dissenting opinion by Hogg, J.; Montgomery, J., not sitting.
2 80 C.J.S., Equity Sec. 67 (1942).
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majority. It follows that in a divorce action involving the custody and
support of children, the court retains, during the minority of the
children, such jurisdiction over the parties as it acquires in the original
action, or in any subsequent ancillary proceeding.3 Most of the states
have enacted statutes incorporating the case law on this point. Ken-
tucky's statute provides:
Pending an application for divorce, or on final judgment,
the court may make orders for the care, custody and maintenance of
the minor children of the parties and any of their children of un-
sound mind. At any time afterward, upon the petition of either
parent, the court may revise any of its orders as to the children, hav-
ing principally in view in all such cases the interest and welfare of
the children. No such order for maintenance of children shall divest
either party of the fee simple title to real estate.4 (Emphasis added)
Thus any modification of the original judgment is generally re-
garded as incidental to, and a step in, the original suit.5 Such modifica-
tion is effected by petition or motion6 by either of the parties and a
hearing thereon. Service of notice of the entry of such motion, and
time of the hearing thereon, must be made on the other party in ac-
cordance with the rules of practice in the trial court.7
It is patent that an initial judgment awarding support would be
void unless the court had such jurisdiction over the person of the party
concerned as would authorize a personal judgment against him.8 If
the jurisdiction in the initial action is such that the court can make a
valid award of support, the continuing nature of the court's jurisdiction
would seem to permit a modification of that judgment by motion and
a hearing thereon after notice.
The appropriate Kentucky civil rule is practically a verbatim adop-
tion of the corresponding federal rule9 and provides, so far as it relates
to the facts of the case, that service of such notice upon a party . . .
shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at
his last known address. .. .".1 This rule concludes with the statement
that, "Service by mail is complete upon mailing."
3Elkins v. Elkins, 55 App. D.C. 9, 299 F. 690 (1924); Van Divort v. Van
Divort, 165 Ohio St. 141, 137 N.E. 2d 684, affirmed 134 N.E. 2d 715 (1956);
Harris v. Harris, 71 Wash. 307, 128 P. 673 (1912).
4 Ky. Rev. Stat. Sec. 403.070 (hereinafter referred to as KRS).
52 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment 457 and n. 90 (2d ed. 1945).6 'Petition", as used in KRS Sec. 403.070, is satisfied by motion to modify the
judgment when the action has been retained on the docket, and by a motion to
redocket and for a modification if the cause has been stricken from the docket.
Hays v. Hays, 219 Ky. 284, 292 S.W. 773 (1927); Franklin v. Franklin, 299 Ky.
426, 185 S.W. 2d 696 (1945).
7 Restatement, Judgments Sec. 6, comment c (1942); 27 C.J.S. 1247 (1941).8 Restatement, Judgments See. 74, comment b and illustration 1 (1942).
9 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 5(b).10 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 5.02.
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The principal case presented the Court with its first opportunity to
construe this particular rule, and there can be little doubt that it ar-
rived at the only reasonable construction." Within the meaning of the
rule, service was valid even though the notice was never received by
appellant. This construction is in accord with that given the cor-
responding federal rule.12
The dissenting opinion felt that there had been a denial of due
process, and,'3 stressing the in personam nature of the judgment, con-
tended that the court did not have such jurisdiction over the person of
the appellant as would authorize a personal judgment against him.
Cases cited in the majority opinion as being in point as to construction
of statutes requiring notice were distinguished as not involving per-
sonal judgments, and authorities were cited in support of this view.' 4
The dissent adopted the position that while the court retained jurisdic-
tion of the cause, the statute did not give it continuing jurisdiction
over the persons of the parties, and that such jurisdiction could be
established only by personal service. This position would seem to be
untenable when it is considered that any order concerning the mainte-
nance of the children would be a mere gesture unless the court does,
in such actions, retain jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. It
seems obvious from the wording of the statute that such orders were
within the contemplation of the legislature, and that the legislature
intended to provide the means of giving effect to such orders.
The principle of continuing jurisdiction is based on the need for
the courts of equity to continue to act in the best interests of the
children. The result of the parent's being deprived of what would
otherwise be a right to personal service in an original action is an
unavoidable factor in securing to the children the continuing protec-
tion of the court. To secure such protection to the children, the court's
jurisdiction must be a continuing one and must not be subject to
termination by the inequitable tendency of state lines to remain
where they are drawn while potentially liable fathers exercise their
11 
"The rule is well established that where a statute is free from ambiguity,
courts are barred from exploring the realms of construction, and that any con-
struction or interpretation of the statute, save that which is 'the plain, obvious and
rational meaning of the statute' (Lynch v. Altworth-Stephens, 267 U.S. 364 at
page 370 .... ) is forbidden." State of Minnesota v. Ristine, 36 F. Supp. 8 (D.
Minn. 1940).
12 2 Moore, Federal Practice 1313-14 and n. 4 (1948, Supp. 1956).
13 Benson v. Benson, 291 S.W. 2d 27 at 81 (Ky. 1956). Hogg, J., felt that
the rule concerned should not be so construed, and that if it were so construed
the rule would constitute a denial of due process by not being reasonably cal-
culated to give notice.
14 Principal reliance was placed on Jasper v. jasper, 224 Ky. 834, 7 S.W. 2d
236 (1928), in which case there was a complete absence of any pretense of
service of legal notice.
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migratory inclinations. So long as the minimum requirements of due
process are met, the judgments of a court of equity in the interests of
children of divorced parents should not be defeated by rules of
procedure. 5
Still, in fairness to either of the parents, it seems that something
more should be required than directing notice to the last known ad-
dress by ordinary mail. Cammack, J., isolated the problem in the
principal case when he concurred with the majority because of the
clear meaning of the rule but questioned the adequacy of that rule in
cases involving a request for substantive relief. He suggested that the
rule might be amended to provide that:
[I]f a motion is for an order or judgment granting a claim for sub-
stantive relief in the nature of a judgment in personam, which relief
is in addition to that sought in the original complaint in the action
or granted by a previous order or judgment in the action, and the
opposing party is not represented by an attorney, notice of the motion
should be served by registered mail.'8
This recommendation is heartily endorsed with one reservation.
It is felt that the words "in the nature of a judgment in personam"
should be omitted. Thus broadened, the recommendation would ex-
tend the use of registered mail to motions for an order or judgment
granting a claim for any substantive relief not previously requested in
the action. In divorce cases, for example, this would bring motions to
modify the child custody provisions of the judgment within the
registered mail category. Such a modification of the present rule would
not only increase the probability of actual notice, but would also tend
to obviate the likelihood of service by gesture.
Robert E. Adams
EVIDENCE-USE OF TnUTH SERum STATEMENTs IN SuBSTANTATInG THE
TESTrONY OF AN IMfPEACHED WrrNEss-The defendant was convicted
of sodomy and statutory rape committed on a fifteen year old girl.
At the trial the girl testified in detail concerning the circumstances of
the offenses. Following her testimony the defense then impeached her
statements by introducing her letters and affidavit retracting all the
allegations of sexual misconduct. In an effort to rebuild their witness's
testimony the prosecution called a psychiatrist who testified that in
his opinion the girl was telling the truth when making the charges.
15 There are few if any inflexible rules of procedure in this kind of case.
Shallcross v. Shallcross, 135 Ky. 418, 122 S.W. 223 (1909).16 Benson v. Benson, supra note 13 (concurring opinion).
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